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Abstract
The seminal book of Gusfield and Irving [GI89] provides a compact and algorithmically useful
way to represent the collection of stable matches corresponding to a given set of preferences. In
this paper, we reinterpret the main results of [GI89], giving a new proof of the characterization
which is able to bypass a lot of the “theory building” of the original works. We also provide
a streamlined and efficient way to compute this representation. Our proofs and algorithms
emphasize the connection to well-known properties of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
1 Introduction
Stable matching mechanisms are ubiquitous in theory and in practice, especially in the “bipartite
case” where agents lie in two disjoint groups and one-to-one matches are made between members
of different groups. The most commonly used stable matching mechanism is the Gale-Shapley
algorithm, i.e. “one-side proposing deferred acceptance”. This algorithm has the nice properties
of being simple to implement, fast to execute, and strategyproof for the proposing side. However,
deferred acceptance always returns the best stable matching for the proposing side and the worst
stable match for the receiving side. This leads to a basic question: what lies in between?
This question can be rephrased as follows: how can one understand, represent, and traverse
the set of all stable matchings for a given set of preference? An excellent answer to this question
was given by [GI89], based on the works [IL86, Irv85, ILG87]. Despite the fact that there can
be exponentially many stable matchings1, the collection of all stable matching can be compactly
represented in a form which is efficient to construct and algorithmically useful, and sheds light on
the structure of the stable matching instance.
In this paper, we reinterpret and simplify the classification provided by [GI89]. We provide full
proofs which characterize the “lattice structure” of the set of stable matchings and culminate in a
theorem equivalent to the main characterization of [GI89]:
Theorem 1.1 (Combination of theorems 4.9 and 5.5). For any stable matching instance, there is
a directed acyclic graph G, computable in O(n2) time, such that there is a bijection between the set
of all stable matchings and the collection of closed subsets of G (i.e. the subsets S of vertices of G
such that no directed edge (u, v) of G has u ∈ S but v /∈ S).
There is a compelling interpretation of the vertices of G. They are called “rotations”, and
represent the fact that, starting from some stable matching, some set of men (m0, . . . ,mk−1) can
“cyclically move partners” (i.e. each mi gets re-matched to the partner of mi+1 (with indices mod
1 For an easy example, consider n/2 “disjoint copies” of an instance with two men and two women which has two
stable matchings. This has 2n/2 stable outcomes.
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k)) to arrive at a new stable matching. A full description of the rotations, and the dependencies
between them, is given in this paper. Indeed, the primary simplifying contribution of this paper is
in focusing on rotations “from the start” instead of going through other notions.
We believe that our proof strategies and presentation is more intuitive and more “fundamentally
algorithmic”, as we focus on how simple properties of the ubiquitous differed acceptance algorithm
can lead us to understand the full set of stable matchings. Furthermore, we give a new perspective
on the algorithm used in [GI89] to construct the compact representation. Along the way, we correct
a minor error in the original algorithm from [GI89] (for details, see appendix B).
While the stable matching problem is a classic and well-studied problem, there are many exciting
contemporary developments in the theory, from worst-case upper bounds on the number of stable
matchings [KGW18] to the communication complexity of finding stable matchings [GNOR19] to
detailed studies of different incentives properties [AG18, Gon14]. Our intent is for this paper to
provide a starting point for researchers interested in studying stable matching markets from an
algorithmic perspective.
1.1 Organization and relation to prior work
For completeness, we prove every result about stable matchings which we will need in this paper.
In section 2, we make our formal definitions and review the basic properties of deferred acceptance
and the set of stable matchings. Readers familiar with stable matchings can likely skip this sec-
tion (possibly reviewing the lattice-theoretic vocabulary given in section 2.3). The core technical
material is presented in sections 3 to 5.
• In section 3, we discuss how to traverse the stable matching lattice algorithmically. Intu-
itively, this involves women “rejecting” their current match, and continuing running differed
acceptance to get to a better stable matching (for the women). Our core technical tool,
inspired by [IM05] is to use the concept of differed acceptance with truncated preferences.
• In section 4, we define a compact representation of the stable matching lattice in terms of
“minimal differences” called rotations, and prove that the representation is correct. Our def-
initions and theorems are as in [GI89], but we are able to significantly simplify our treatment
by focusing on rotations “from the start” and avoiding intermediate representations. In par-
ticular, claim 4.7 and its proof using claim 4.6 are the key new ideas, which provide a way
to show that a graph represents a lattice using a proof approach which (to the best of our
knowledge) is brand new. Appendix A provides a detailed comparison of our methods and
those of [GI89].
• In section 5, we show how to efficiently construct the compact representation defined in
section 4. While our algorithm is essentially equivalent to that in [GI89] (figure 3.2 on page
110), we provide a more streamlined way to find the “predecessor relations” between rotations,
which are the edges of the graph G, and thus avoid a minor error in the way that [GI89] finds
these predecessor relations. In appendix B, we point out and correct this minor error. Our
presentation is similar to that of the “MOSM to WOSM” algorithm in [AKL17], which relates
more clearly to our conceptual use of differed acceptance.
2 Stable Matchings and Deferred Acceptance
We start with the basic definitions. A matching market is a collection M of “men” and W of
“women”, where each man m ∈ M has a ranking over women in W, represented as list ordered
from most preferred to least preferred, and vice versa. Lists may be partial, and agents included
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on the list of some a ∈ M ∪ W are called the acceptable partners of a. We write w1 ≻m w2 if
w1 is ranked higher than w2 on m’s list (or if w1 is acceptable but w2 is not ranked at all). We
also denote the fact that w is not an acceptable partner of m by ∅ ≻m w, and conversely if w is
an acceptable partner of m we write w ≻m ∅. A matching is a set of vertex disjoint edges in the
bipartite graph G(M,W ), where (m,w) ∈ E(G) if and only if m is acceptable to w and vice versa.
We denote a matching by µ :M∪W →M∪W ∪{∅}, where µ(i) is the matched partner of agent
i. We write µ(i) = ∅ if agent i is unmatched.
For a set of preferences P = {≻w}w∈W ∪ {≻m}m∈M and any matching µ, a man/woman pair
(m,w) is called blocking if we simultaneously have m ≻w µ(w) and w ≻m µ(w). A matching µ is
stable for a set of preferences P if no unmatched man/woman pair is blocking for P . A pair (m,w)
is called stable for P if µ(m) = w in some stable matching, and m is called a stable partner of w
(and vice-versa).
2.1 MPDA and the man-optimal stable matching
The most natural way to find stable matchings is with the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm.
In this paper, we consider man proposing deferred acceptance (MPDA) as given in Algorithm 1.
For completeness, here we provide simple proofs of the basic but crucially important properties of
this algorithm.
Algorithm 1 MPDA: Men-proposing deferred acceptance
Let U =M be the set of unmatched men
Let µ be an all empty matching
while U 6= ∅ and some m ∈ U has not proposed to every woman on his list do
Pick such a m (in any order)
m “proposes” to their highest-ranked woman w which they have not yet proposed to
if m ≻w µ(w) then
If µ(w) 6= ∅, add µ(w) to U
Set µ(w) = m, remove m from U
Intuitively, this algorithm starts with the men doing whatever they prefer the most, then doing
the minimal amount of work to make the matching stable. Indeed, men propose in their order of
preference. If a woman w ever rejected a manm they prefer over their current match, then remained
with their current match, then (m,w) would clearly create an instability in the final matching.
Claim 2.1. The output of MPDA is a stable matching.
Proof. First, observe that the MPDA algorithm terminates because every man will propose to
every woman at most once. The claim follows from two simple invariants of the algorithm:
• Men propose in their order of preference.
• Women can only increase the rank of their tentative match over time (and once they are
matched, they stay matched).
Formally, consider a pair m ∈ M, w ∈ W which is unmatched in the output matching µ. Suppose
for contradiction w ≻m µ(m) and m ≻w µ(w). In the MPDA algorithm, m would propose to w
before µ(m). This means that w received a proposal from a man she preferred over her eventual
match µ(w), a contradiction.
Note that this algorithm gives us a very interesting existence result: it was not at all clear that
stable matching existed before we had this algorithm.
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We can now formalize our intuition thatMPDA does the least amount of work needed to result
in a stable outcome (after men propose to their favorite women). We show that every rejection
which happens in MPDA must happen in order for a stable matching to result. The proof uses
the following technique: although it’s not immediately easy to show an event can’t happen, you
can show it can’t happen for the first time.
Claim 2.2. If a man m ∈ M is ever rejected by a woman w ∈ W during some run of MPDA
(that is, m proposes to w and w does not accept) then no stable matching can pair m to w.
Proof. Let µ be any matching. Suppose that some pair, matched in µ, is rejected during MPDA.
Consider the first time during in the run of MPDA where such a rejection occurs, i.e. a woman w
rejects µ(w) but no other woman w′ has rejected µ(w′) so far. In particular, let w reject m = µ(w)
in favor of m′ 6= m (either because m′ proposed to w, or because m′ was already matched to w and
m proposed). We have m′ ≻w m, so if m
′ is unmatched in µ, then µ is unstable. Thus we have
µ(m′) = w′ 6= w, and because this is the first time any man has been rejected by a match from µ,
m′ has not yet proposed to w′. Because men propose in their preference order, we have w ≻m′ w
′.
However, this means µ is not stable.
Thus, no woman can ever reject a stable partner in MPDA.
By the previous claim, MPDA moves the men down their preference lists the minimal amount
required to enforce stability. Interestingly, a completely dual phenomenon occurs for the women’s
preferences.
Corollary 2.3. Let the set of men and women who receive a match at the end of MPDA be denote
Mmatched and Wmatched, respectively. In this matching µ:
1. every m ∈ Mmatched is paired to his best stable match.
2. every w ∈ Wmatched is paired to their worst stable match.
Proof. Over the course of MPDA, each man m ∈ Mmatched was rejected by every woman which
he prefers to his partner in MPDA. By claim 2.2, this means his partner in MPDA is his top
stable match.
Let m ∈ M and w ∈ W be paired by MPDA. Let µ be any stable matching which does not
pair m and w. We must have w ≻m µ(m), because w is the best stable partner of m. If m ≻w µ(w),
then µ is not stable. Thus, w cannot be stably matched to any man she prefers less than m.
The last claim also implies that the matching output by MPDA is independent of the order in
which men are selected to propose.
2.2 General stable matchings
Interestingly, our claim 2.2, which related toMPDA, can be used to prove a fundamental property
of the set of all stable matchings. Specifically, we can prove the following weaker version of the
rural hospital theorem2 which will be key for much of our discussion in section 3.
Claim 2.4 (Rural Hospital Theorem). Then the set of unmatched agents is the same across every
stable outcome.
2 The full rural hospital theorem [Rot86] applies to many-to-one matching markets (i.e. the residents and hospitals
problem). The conclusion is that if a hospital does not fill all its openings in some stable outcome, then it will fail
to fill all its openings (and indeed receive exactly the same doctors) in every stable outcome.
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Proof. Let Msingle be the set of men unmatched at the end of MPDA. Observe that each man in
Msingle has proposed to every acceptable partner he has over the run of MPDA. Thus, claim 2.2
implies that Msingle is unmatched in every stable outcome. On the other hand, reversing the roll
of men and women and considering women-proposing deferred acceptance, we can see that the set
of (un)matched women is also identical across every stable outcome.
µ
µ′
µ′
m′
m w
w′
Claim 2.3 seems to indicate that that the incentives of women and men
are exactly opposite with regards to the results of man-proposing or women-
proposing deferred acceptance. These next two claims prove that this is true for
all stable matchings. In 2.3, we investigate these “order theoretic” properties
further.
Claim 2.5. Let µ, µ′ be stable matchings, and say µ(m) = w, but µ′(m) 6= w.
Then µ′(m) ≻m w if and only if µ
′(w) ≺w m.
Proof. (⇐) “If w downgrades, then m upgrades”. Suppose µ′(w) ≺w m. Be-
cause µ′ is stable, yetm and w are not matched in µ′, we must have µ′(m) ≻m w,
or else (m,w) would form a blocking pair. (A rephrasing: this direction is easy
because the definition of stability immediately makes it impossible form and w to both downgrade).
(⇒) “If w upgrades, then m downgrades”. Let m′ = µ′(w) 6= m and w′ = µ′(m) 6= w. Suppose
that m′ ≻w m, and for contradiction suppose that w
′ ≻m w. Because µ
′ is stable, (m′, w′) is not a
blocking pair, so either w ≻m′ w
′ or m ≻w′ m
′. In the first case, (m′, w) form a blocking pair in µ,
and in the second case, (m,w′) form a blocking pair in µ. Thus, in either case µ is not stable.
Claim 2.6. Let µ and µ′ be stable matchings. Every man (weakly) prefers their match in µ over
µ′ if and only if every woman (weakly) prefers their match in µ′ over µ.
Proof. Suppose each m ∈ M has µ′(m) m µ(m). For each w ∈ W with µ(w) 6= µ
′(w), we must
have µ′(w) ≺w µ(w) by claim 2.5. The proof for the other direction is identical.
2.3 The Lattice of Stable Matchings
Given that men and women have strictly opposite incentives, it is natural to define a dominance
relationship over all stable matchings according to the preferences of one side of the market.
Definition 2.7. We say that a stable matching µ woman-dominates µ′, written µ ≥ µ′, if for every
w ∈ W, we have µ(w) w µ
′(w) (that is, every woman is at least as happy with her match in µ as
in µ′). For some fixed set of preferences, we let L denote the set of stable matchings of P , ordered
by the relation ≥.
We can define man-dominance analogously, and by claim 2.6, µ man-dominates µ′ if and only
if µ ≤ µ′. Now, one can visualize the collection of all stable matchings as starting with the unique
man-optimal outcome at the bottom, the unique woman-optimal outcome at the top, and all other
stable matching in between.
In this section we show that the set of all stable matchings for a set of preferences P forms
what’s called a distributive lattice under the women-dominance order. For the sake of completeness,
we first discuss the relevant definitions. Informally, a lattice is a partial order in which, for any two
elements a, b, there is a unique “lowest element above a and b” (the join) and a “highest element
below a and b” (the meet)3.
3 Note that it follows from the definition that join and meet operations, if they exist, are unique.
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Definition 2.8. A partial order ≤ is a reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric relation. We write
a < b when a ≤ b and a 6= b.
For elements a, b of a partial order, a least upper bound a∨ b is an element such that a ≤ a∨ b
and b ≤ a ∨ b, and for any c such that a ≤ c and b ≤ c, we have a ∨ b ≤ c. A greatest lower bound
a ∧ b is defined analogously, interchanging ≤ with ≥. We also call a ∨ b the join of a and b and
a ∧ b the meet of a and b.
A lattice L is a partial order in which there exist greatest lower bounds and least upper bounds
for any a, b ∈ L.
A chain in a lattice is any “totally ordered” sequence a1 ≤ a2 ≤ . . . ≤ ak.
A lattice L is distributive if the join and meet operations satisfy the following equations:
a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c)
a ∨ (b ∧ c) = (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c)
The join and meet operations in L are very natural: the join of µ and µ′ corresponds to the
matching µ˜ where each woman gets the better of her two partners from µ and µ′. This is exactly
the operation one would hope would work – clearly µ˜ is the worst matching (for the women) in
which women do at least as well as in µ and µ′. We prove below that this operation always yields
a stable matching.
Definition 2.9. Given stable matchings µ and µ′, define µ ∨ µ′ such that, for each woman w,
(µ∨µ′)(w) is the most preferred partner of w among µ(w) and µ′(w). Similarly, define µ∧µ′ such
that each woman is matched to their least preferred partner from µ or µ′.
Theorem 2.10. The collection L of all stable matchings of some instance form a distributive lattice
under the dominance ordering ≤, with join and meet given by ∨ and ∧.
Proof. It’s easy to see that ≤ forms a partial order on L. We’ll show that ∨ gives least upper
bounds in L. It’s easy to see that, if µ˜ = µ ∨ µ′ is a stable matching, then it must be the least
upper bound of µ and µ′.
First, we claim that µ˜ is a matching. Suppose for contradiction that some man m is the match
of two women w and w′ in µ˜. Without loss of generality suppose µ(w) = m, so m = µ(w) ≻w µ
′(w),
and µ′(w′) = m, so m = µ′(w′) ≻w′ µ(w
′). Applying claim 2.5 twice, we get that w = µ(m) ≺m
µ′(m) = w′ and also that w′ = µ′(m) ≺m µ(m) = w, a contradiction.
Second, we claim that µ˜ is stable. Suppose that (m,w) is a blocking pair for µ˜, Certainly the
partners of m and w must be from different matchings among µ or µ′, say µ˜(m) = µ′(m) and
µ˜(w) = µ(w) 6= µ′(w). As (m,w) is blocking, w ≻m µ
′(m) and m ≻w µ(w). But by the definition
of µ˜, we have µ(w) ≻w µ
′(w), so m ≻w µ
′(w) as well, and µ′ is not stable.
Now we show that ∧ gives the greatest lower bound in L. By claim 2.5, this is equivalent to
defining µ ∧ µ′ such that every man gets their best partner from µ or µ′ (because m = µ(w) ≺w
µ′(w) if and only if w = µ(m) ≻m µ
′(m)). Thus, the proof is identical to the proof given for ∨,
interchanging men with women.
Finally, the join and meet operations are distributive for the same reason that the operations
of min and max distribute over each other. In particular, we can fix a woman w and see that (with
max and min taken according to ≻w)
(
µ1 ∧ (µ2 ∨ µ3)
)
(w) = min
{
µ1(w),max
{
µ2(w), µ3(w)
}}
max
{
min
{
µ1(w), µ2(w)
}
,min
{
µ1(w), µ3(w)
}}
=
(
(µ1 ∧ µ2) ∨ (µ1 ∧ µ3)
)
(w)
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The most important lattice-theoretic concept we will need is the notion of covering. Informally,
an element covers another in a lattice if there is no element between them in the ordering.
Definition 2.11. For a, b elements of a lattice, we say a covers b when a > b and no element c
exists with a > c > b.
A useful equivalent definition of covering is the following: a covers b if and only if whenever
a ≥ c > b, we have a = c. Although the concept of covering relations is central to our paper, we
need remarkably few formal properties of covering relations (or of lattices for that matter). Here
is what we will need:
Claim 2.12. In any finite lattice and for any a ≤ b, there exists a sequence a = a0 < a1 < . . . <
ak = b (for some k ≥ 0) such that ai covers ai−1 for each i. Such a sequence is called a maximal
chain between a and b.
Proof. If a = b we are done. Otherwise, let S be the set of all elements c such that a < c < b, and
induct on |S|. If |S| = 0, then b covers a and we are done. Otherwise, take any c ∈ S. Consider the
set of all d such that a < d < c. For such a d, we have a < d < b and also d 6= c. Thus, there are
strictly fewer than |S| such d. Thus, by induction, there exists a maximal chain between a and c.
Similarly, there exists a maximal chain between c and d, so the concatenation of these two chains
gives us a maximal chain between a and b.
We are interested in covering relations in L because they describe the “minimal differences”
needed to go from one stable matching to another. The previous claim hints that one can describe
any matching µ by giving the “covering relations leading up to µ”. Eventually, we will describe
all covering relations (using “rotations”) and show how you can represent all stable matchings as
certain subsets of these “minimal differences”.
3 Navigating the Lattice of Stable Matchings
In this section, we study how the lattice-theoretic properties of L start to manifest algorithmically
in certain special cases of MPDA. We’ll characterize the covering relations (and thus the entire
structure of the lattice), essentially in terms of execution traces of MPDA. Intuitively, the main
result is that, starting from any stable matching, if a woman has a better stable partner, then she
can “divorce” her husband, and if we keep running MPDA, we will arrive at a stable matching
preferred by that woman.
Consider a fixed set of input preferences P .
Definition 3.1. For a set of preferences P and matching µ stable under P , define P (µ) as follows:
every woman w matched in µ truncates the end of their preference list just after µ(w) (removing all
men ranked worse than their current match), and every man m matched in µ truncates the beginning
their preference list just before µ(m) (removing all women ranked better than their current match).
Women unmated in µ keep their full preference list, and men unmatched in µ are removed from
P (µ).
For a woman w matched in µ, define Pw(µ) the same as P (µ) with one additional change:
woman w truncates her preference list one more place by removing her current match µ(m).
Intuitively, P (µ) defines the state we are in after a deferred acceptance type algorithm reaching
matching µ: the women are still seeking to improve beyond their current match and the men are
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still proposing down their lists. On the other hand, Pw(µ) represents preferences corresponding to
woman w attempting to reach next to a better match than µ(w) (by rejecting µ(w) in MPDA).
In what follows, we call a match stable if it is stable for the original set of preferences P . If we
need to refer to the fact that a match is stable for some truncated set of preferences Pw(µ), we will
specify so. We denote Mmatched and Msingle as the set of men who are matched and unmatched
respectively in the stable matchings with the original preferences P (recall from 2.4 that these sets
are uniquely determined). Define Wmatched and Wsingle analogously.
Note that the execution of MPDA(Pw(µ0)) is quite a bit more simple than a general execution
of MPDA. After the first proposal of each man in Mmatched (i.e. each m ∈ Mmatched \ {µ0(w)}
proposes to and is accepted by µ0(m)), there is exactly one “free” man from Mmatched at a time
(i.e. one man who is not tentatively matched and still proposing down his list), until there is no
longer a free man and the execution terminates. Specifically, the free man is initially µ0(w), and if
a proposal from the free man is accepted by a woman w′ ∈ Wmatched \ {w}, the free man becomes
µ0(w
′). If a proposal is accepted by w or a woman from Wsingle, or if a man proposes to the last
woman on his preference list, the algorithm terminates. In order to capture such an execution
sequence we make the following definition:
Definition 3.2. Given a stable matching µ0 and a woman w ∈ Wmatched, the rejection chain of w
starting from µ0 is the list (w1,m1, w2,m2, . . . , ai) defined as follows:
• w1 = w and m1 = µ0(w)
• The men mi are, in order, the men from Mmatched which are free during the execution of
MPDA(Pw(µ0))
• For each i, wi+1 is the woman (if any) who accepts a proposal from mi
• The list ends when the algorithm terminates
We also call such a list “the rejection chain of MPDA(Pw(µ0))” or just “the rejection chain”
if w and µ0 are understood.
We start by establishing some basic properties relating rejection chains to the match returned
by MPDA(Pw(µ0)). The proof is immediate.
Claim 3.3. Let µ0 be a stable match and let w ∈ Wmatched. Let µ
′ be the result of MPDA(Pw(µ0))
and let (w1,m1, w2,m2, . . . , ai) be the rejection chain of w starting from µ0 (so ai denote the last
agent in the rejection chain). Then exactly one of the following is true:
• ai ∈ Wsingle is a woman who is now matched in µ
′
• ai is a man from Mmatched who is now unmatched in µ
′
• ai = w (and w receives a match in µ
′ if and only if ai = w)
Moreover, the set of agents matched in µ′ is the same as that in µ0 if and only if ai = w.
Our goal is to expore the stable matching lattice L using the operation (µ0, w) 7→MPDA(Pw(µ0)).
Thus, the first thing we need to know is when this operation keeps us in the lattice L and when
the result is an unstable matching.
Claim 3.4. Let µ0 be stable and take w ∈ Wmatched. Let MPDA(Pw(µ0)) terminate in a matching
µ′. Then µ′ is stable if and only if w receives a match in µ′.
Proof. If w is not matched in µ′, then the set of matched agents differs between µ0 and µ
′. Thus
µ′ cannot possibly be stable by the rural hospital theorem 2.4.
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On the other hand, suppose w receives a match in µ′. By the previous claim, this means that the
set of agents matched in µ0 and µ
′ are identical. Consider how MPDA(Pw(µ0)) runs, converting
from µ0 to µ
′. Observe that, because w receives a match (which she prefers to µ0(w)), every woman
can only improve their preference for their match.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose (m′, w′) is a blocking pair in µ′. Certainly, µ′ is stable
for the preferences Pw(µ0). How can (m
′, w′) be a blocking pair in P but not in Pw(µ0)? The only
way is if one agent truncated the other off their preference list in Pw(µ0). We have two cases:
1. Suppose w′ truncated m′. Then we have m′ w′ µ0(w
′) w′ µ
′(w′). But m′ ≻w′ µ
′(w′), a
contradiction.
2. Now suppose m′ truncated w′. Then w′ ≻m′ µ0(m
′). But then m′ ≻w′ µ
′(w′) w′ µ0(w
′), so
(m′, w′) are unstable in µ0, a contradiction.
Next, we need to know that, if we have not reached the woman-optimal stable match, then
we can always keep moving up in the lattice. Intuitively, this is true because, whenever a stable
matching exists, MPDA will find it, so if a stable matching with women receiving good partners
exists, then MPDA will find it as well.
Claim 3.5. If µ0 is a stable matching in which w is not paired to her optimal stable partner, then
MPDA(Pw(µ0)) will return a stable matching µ
′ which strictly woman-dominates µ0, i.e. µ
′ > µ0.
Conversely, if MPDA(Pw(µ0)) fails to return a stable match, then w is matched to her optimal
stable partner in µ0.
Moreover, if µ′ covers µ0 in L, then MPDA(Pw(µ0)) returns µ
′ for any woman w who receives
a better partner in µ′ than in µ0.
Proof. Let µ∗ be any stable matching in which w has a better partner than in µ0, i.e. µ
∗(w) ≻w
µ0(w). Without loss of generality, we can assume that µ
∗ ≥ µ0, because if this is not the case, we
can replace µ∗ with µ∗ ∨ µ0. By the rural hospital theorem (claim 2.4), µ
∗ must have exactly the
same set of matched agents as in µ0.
Let µ′ =MPDA(Pw(µ0)), and note that µ
′ is certainly stable for preferences Pw(µ0). Because
µ∗ ≥ µ0 and w gets matched strictly above µ0(w), the matching µ
∗ is also stable for preferences
Pw(µ0). Thus, once again µ
∗ and µ0 have identical sets of matched agents. By claim 3.4, we
conclude that µ′ is stable for preferences P .
By the definition of Pw(µ0), each woman will only accept a proposal in MPDA(Pw(µ0)) from
a man she likes at least as much as in µ0. As w receives a strictly better match in µ
′, we have
µ′ > µ0.
For the converse, supposew is matched to her optimal stable partner in µ0. In µ =MPDA(Pw(µ0)),
w will not accept a proposal except from a man ranked above her match in µ0. Thus, µ cannot
possibly be stable, as then w would be matched in µ to a stable partner better than µ0(w).
Now, suppose µ′ covers µ0, so that whenever µ
′ ≥ µ > µ0, we have that µ = µ′, and let w
be any woman recieving a better match in µ′ than in µ0. We claim that µ
′ is the man-optimal
stable outcome in which each woman in Wmatched receives a partner at least as good as in µ0, and
where w receives a strictly better partner. Indeed, if µ′ were not this matching, then some µ would
exist such that µ′ > µ > µ0, and so µ
′ would not cover µ0. By the fact that MPDA returns the
man-optimal stable outcome (claim 2.3) this exactly menas that µ′ is the result ofMPDA(Pw(µ0)).
The previous claims show that if a woman w has a better stable match, she can reject her current
match, and if we continue running deferred acceptance then w will achieve a better outcome. Next
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we get a characterization of when these changes from matching to matching are as small as possible
(i.e. when the new matching covers the old in the lattice L).
Claim 3.6. Suppose µ0 is stable and MPDA(Pw(µ0)) terminates in a stable matching µ
′ > µ0.
Then µ′ covers µ0 if and only if during the run of MPDA(Pw(µ0)), no woman from Wmatched
receives more than one proposal from men who she strictly prefers to her match in µ0.
Proof. For this proof, call a proposal good if it is made by some man m′ to some woman w′, where
w′ prefers m′ to µ0(w
′). Note that a woman does not necessarily accept a good proposal (if she has
already seen a proposal from a man she likes even more).
(⇒) Suppose that, while running MPDA(Pw(µ0)), some woman sees more than one good
proposal. Because MPDA(Pw(µ0)) terminates as soon as w sees a good proposal, this woman
cannot be w. Let w∗ 6= w be the first such woman, i.e. when w∗ receives her second good proposal,
no other woman has yet received a second good proposal.
Consider running MPDA(Pw∗(µ0)), and call the result µ. As MPDA progresses, we know
that each woman receives exactly one good proposal, because w∗ was the first instance where
a woman received two good proposals. Thus, the rejection chain of MPDA(Pw∗(µ0)) is a sub-
list of the rejection chain of MPDA(Pw(µ0)), with one notable exception: w
∗ might not accept
her second good proposal in MPDA(Pw(µ0)), but she will definitely accept the corresponding
proposal in MPDA(Pw∗(µ0)). Regardless of this event, every woman who changes partners in
MPDA(Pw∗(µ0)) will also change partners in MPDA(Pw(µ0)), and indeed will do at least as well
in the end, so µ ≤ µ′. As w could not have possibly changed partners in MPDA(Pw∗(µ0)), this
means µ < µ′. We already knew that µ0 < µ, so this completes the proof that µ
′ does not cover
µ0.
(⇐) For the other direction, suppose no woman sees multiple good proposals. Now suppose
µ0 < µ ≤ µ
′ for some stable match µ. Let E = (w,m1, w2,m2, . . . , wk,mk, w) be the rejection
chain of MPDA(Pw(µ0)). We’ll show that, for any i, the outcome of MPDA(Pwi(µ0)) is also
µ′. For each woman wi in E, consider the rejection chain Ei of wi starting at µ0. For each
man mj , consider each woman w on his preference list strictly between wj and wj+1. Each such
woman rejected him in MPDA(Pw(µ0)), and the only way for a woman to then accept mj in
MPDA(Pwi(µ0)) is if mj is a good proposal for w, but w had already seen an (even better) good
proposal in MPDA(Pw(µ0)). Because we assume no woman receives multiple good proposals, this
is impossible, so each w between wj and wj+1 will still reject mj . Furthermore, wj+1 will still
accept him, as she has not yet seen a good proposal when mj proposes to her. Thus, each link
of Ei will be the same as in E, that is, Ei will simply be (wi,mi, wi+1, . . . ,mi−1, wi) (with indices
taken mod k). Thus, the outcome of MPDA(Pwi(µ0)) is µ
′.
Because µ0 6= µ, some woman must receive a strictly better match in µ than in µ0. As µ ≤
µ′, that woman must be wi for some i. Because MPDA returns man-optimal stable outcomes
(claim 2.3), µ′ = MPDA(Pwi(µ0)) is the man-optimal stable outcome in which every woman
receives a match at least as good as in µ0, and in which wi receives a strictly better match. As µ is
such a matching, we have µ′ ≤ µ and thus µ′ = µ. Because µ′ was an arbitrary element of L with
µ0 < µ ≤ µ
′, we’ve shown that µ′ covers µ0.
Remark. With the results of this section, we could already build the entire stable matching
lattice L, represented by its covering relations. Namely, we could essentially breadth-first search
the lattice L, finding those matching which cover a given µ0 by calculating MPDA(Pw(µ0)) for
each woman w (and keeping track of whether any woman receives multiple proposals from a man
she prefers to her old match from µ0).
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w1
w2
w3
m1
m2
m3
m3
w1
w2 w3
m1m3
m3
m2
ρ1
ρ2
m1 w1 w2
m2 w2 w3
m3 w3 w2 w1
w1 m3 m1
w2 m1 m3 m2
w3 m2 m3
Figure 1: A rejection chain with no repeated agents does not imply a covering relationship
Example. The condition in claim 3.6 is subtly different from an agent appearing multiple times
in the rejection chain. For instance, consider the example illustrated in Figure 1, and let µ0 =
{(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)} be the man-optimal stable outcome. Agents only appear one time
in MPDA(Pw1(µ0))’s rejection chain (w1,m1, w2,m2, w3,m3, w1). However, µ
∗ := {(m1, w2),
(m2, w3), (m3, w1)}, the resulting stable matching from MPDA(Pw1(µ0)), does not cover µ0. In
fact, MPDA(Pw2(µ0)) results in a stable matching µ1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w1)} such that
µ0 < µ1 < µ
∗. Intuitively, what happened is that, because w2 received a proposal from both m1
and m3 in MPDA(Pw1(µ0)), she actually had two opportunities to upgrade and reach a better
stable matching. Thus, the change from µ0 to µ
∗ can be broken down into two steps, where one
step must come before the other (namely, µ1 must be reached before µ
∗). In the next section, we’ll
see how to formalize these concepts using rotations and predecessor relations.
4 Rotations
We now define a concise way to describe the difference between “consecutive” stable matchings,
i.e. pairs of matchings where one covers the other. The collection of these “minimal differences”
will allow us to represent all stable matchings in a principled and compact way.
Definition 4.1. Let µ ∈ L be a stable matching and ρ = [(w0,m0), (w1,m1), . . . , (wk−1,mk−1)] a
list of agents with each wi ∈ W and mi ∈ M, and µ(wi) = mi for each i. The elimination of ρ
from µ is the matching µ′ such that µ′(mi) = wi+1 for i = 0, . . . , k − 1 (with indices taken mod k)
and µ′(m) = µ(m) for each m which doesn’t appear in ρ.
We say ρ is a rotation exposed in µ when µ′ is a stable matching, and µ′ covers µ.
The collection of all rotations which are exposed in some µ ∈ L is called the set of rotations,
and is denoted by Π.
We can “visualize” rotations as follows: if the men in the rotation all “get up” from their match
in µ and move one place to the right (cyclically) in the rotation, then we arrive at a new stable match
(which covers the old one). Note that we only call a list of agents ρ a rotation when there exists a
µ0 such that the elimination of ρ from µ0 covers µ0. We view two rotations as equivalent if they
differ by a cyclic shift, i.e. ρ as above is identified with [(wi,mi), (wi+1,mi+1), . . . , (wi−1,mi−1)]
(indices taken mod k) for any i. By the definition, it is clear that such a shift changes nothing. For
the rest of this section, all indices in rotations are considered mod k where k is the length of the
rotation. We say each pair (wi,mi) appears in rotation ρ, and that ρ moves mi from wi to wi+1
and moves wi from mi to mi−1. If ρ moves m from wi to wi+1, and m ranks w between wi and wi+1
(that is, wi ≻m w ≻m wi+1), we say that ρ moves m from above w to below w. Define the meaning
of the phrase “ρ moves woman w from below m to above m” and related phrases analogously.
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Given the discussion in the previous section, we arrive easily at a rich set of claims characterizing
rotations and their relationship to each other. Claim 4.2 translates the language of rotations to
the concept of MPDA with truncated lists, as discussed in section 3, then claim 4.3 lists the basic
properties of rotations.
Claim 4.2. For any stable matching µ0, the following are equivalent:
• ρ = [(w0,m0), . . . , (wk−1,mk−1)] is a rotation exposed in µ0, and µ
′ is the elimination of ρ
from µ0
• MPDA(Pw0(µ0)) produces the stable matching µ
′, and during its execution no woman receives
multiple proposals from a man she prefers to her match in µ0, and the rejection chain of w0
starting from µ0 is exactly (w0,m0, w1,m1, . . . , wk−1,mk−1, w0).
Moreover, µ′ covers µ0 if and only if there exists a rotation ρ exposed in µ0 such that µ
′ is the
elimination of ρ from µ0.
Proof. By claim 3.6, µ′ = MPDA(Pw0(µ0)) is a stable matching which covers µ0 if and only
if during its execution no woman receives multiple proposals from a man she prefers to her
match in µ0, and w0 receives a match in µ
′. In this case, the rejection chain is of the form
(w0,m0, w1,m1, . . . , wk−1,mk−1, w0), and the stable matching µ
′ is exactly is exactly the elimina-
tion of ρ = [(w0,m0), . . . , (wk−1,mk−1)] from µ0.
By definition, the elimination of a rotation from µ0 always covers µ0. Furthermore, claim 3.5
tells us that whenever µ′ covers µ0, runningMPDA(Pw(µ0)) will produce µ
′ (and by claim 3.6 this
will differ from µ0 by the elimination of a rotation).
Claim 4.3. We have the following:
1. (w,m) are stable partners (i.e. matched in some stable matching) if and only if (w,m) appears
in some rotation in Π or (w,m) are paired in the woman-optimal stable outcome.
2. Let (wi,mi) appear in some rotation (indexed as above). Then mi−1 is the worst-ranked stable
partner of wi who wi ranks above mi (and similarly wi+1 is the best-ranked stable partner of
mi who mi ranks below wi). In other words, rotations move agents to their “next” stable
partners (for women, the next best stable partner, and for men, the next-worst).
3. A pair (w,m) of men and women appear in at most one rotation together.
4. There are at most
(
n
2
)
rotations in Π.
Proof. (1) The “if” direction is true by definition. For the “only if” part, let µ0 be a matching
other than the woman-optimal outcome, and let µ0(m) = w for (m,w) not paired in the woman-
optimal outcome. Let µ′ be the woman-optimal stable outcome. Consider any maximal chain
µ0 < µ1 < . . . < µk = µ
′ between µ0 and µk (i.e. µi covers µi−1 for each i). Because w is not
matched to m in µ′, there must be some covering relation µi−1 < µi where w is at m in µi−1 but
not in µi. By claim 4.2, this corresponds to a rotation in which (m,w) appears.
(2) Let the rotation ρ be exposed in µ0 and let the elimination of ρ from µ0 be µ
′. Suppose
for the sake of contradiction that wi has a stable partner m
∗ who she ranks between mi−1 and mi,
i.e. mi ≺w m
∗ ≺w mi−1. Let µ
∗ pair wi and m
∗. Consider the matching µ = (µ0 ∨ µ
∗) ∧ µ′. We
have µ ≤ µ′, and because µ0 ≤ µ
′ and µ0 ≤ µ0 ∨ µ
∗, we also get µ0 ≤ µ. Because µ(wi) = m
∗,
that means µ0 < µ < µ
′, which contradicts the fact that µ′ covers µ0. This proves that mi−1 is the
worse stable partner of wi after mi. The proof that, for each man mi, wi+1 is the next best stable
partner mi has below wi is analagous.
(3) By part 2, given one pair (mi, wi), the value of wi+1 is uniquely determined as the next
stable partner of mi below wi. But then, by considering mi and wi+1, the value of mi+1 is uniquely
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determined as the worst stable partner of wi+1 before mi. Continuing this process, we see that
specifying one pair in ρ uniquely determines all of ρ.
(4). By part 1, each man can appear with at most n − 1 agents in some rotation (each of his
stable partners except his partner in the woman-optimal outcome), and by part 3 that pair can
appear at most once. At least two pairs of agents appear in each rotation, so the total number of
rotations is at most n(n− 1)/2.
We already know a decent amount about the structure of individual rotations. However, the
rotations interact in a specified way. In particular, there is a natural ordering among them – some
rotations must be eliminated before others. To make this precise, we need some definitions.
Definition 4.4. Let ρ1 and ρ2 be rotations in Π.
1. If there exists a man/woman pair (w,m) such that ρ1 moves m to w, and (w,m) appear in
ρ2 (i.e. ρ2 moves m away from w), then ρ1 is called a type 1 predecessor of ρ2
2. If there exist a man/woman pair (w,m) such that:
• ρ1 moves w from mj to mj−1, and mj ≺w m ≺w mj−1
(ρ1 moves w from below to above m)
• ρ2 moves m from wi to wi+1, and wi ≻m w ≻m wi+1
(ρ2 moves m from above to below w)
Then ρ1 is called a type 2 predecessor of ρ2.
If ρ1 is either a type 1 or type 2 predecessor of ρ2, we say ρ1 is a predecessor of ρ2.
Define the predecessor graph G(Π) on rotations as follows: the vertices are every rotation ρ ∈ Π,
for every ρ1, ρ2 such that ρ1 is a predecessor of ρ2, there is a directed edge from ρ1 to ρ2 (labeled
according to whether they are predecessors of type 1 or type 2 (or both)).
In short, ρ1 is a type 1 predecessor of ρ2 if ρ1 move a couple (m,w) together who ρ2 moves
apart. In this case, ρ1 must be eliminated first by definition. Intuitively, ρ1 is a type 2 predecessor
of ρ2 if runningMPDA to eliminate ρ2 would trigger the elimination of ρ1. Otherwise, for the pair
(m,w) in the definition, m would propose to w as he moves from wi to wi+1, and w would accept
that proposal and trigger the elimination of ρ1 (finally giving w an even better match than m).
It turns out that the above two types of predecessor relations are necessary and sufficient to
characterize which rotations must be eliminated before each other. More precisely, a permutation
of the set of all rotations can be eliminated, one after the other, if and only if they are topologically
sorted in the graph G(Π)4.
We first prove that every possible sequence of eliminations forms a topological sort of G(Π). As
we will formally spell out in 4.9, this means that topological sorts of G(Π) suffice to represent all
stable matchings.
Claim 4.5. Consider any chain µ0 < µ1 < . . . < µk in L where µ0 is man-optimal, µk is woman-
optimal, and µi+1 covers µi for each i (i.e. consider a maximal chain in L). Then
1. Then there exists a unique sequence of rotations ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1 ∈ Π such that µi+1 is the
elimination of ρi from µi for each i.
2. Every rotation in Π appears exactly once in this sequence.
4 A topological sort of a directed acyclic graph is a permutation of the vertices of the graph such that, for each
directed edge (u, v) in the graph, u comes before v.
13
3. If ρ is a predecessor of ρ∗ (of type 1 or type 2), then ρ appears before ρ∗ in this sequence.
Proof. (1) By claim 4.2, such a ρi exists for each i. Furthermore, given µi and µi+1, it’s clear that
ρi is uniquely determined.
(2) We showed in claim 4.3, part 2 that rotations (and hence covering relations) move agents
up or down one place on their list of stable partners. Thus, over the course of the maximal chain,
every stable pair must be matched in some µi (or else those agents could not reach their match in
the woman-optimal outcome). Moreover, each stable pair which is not matched in µk must appear
in some rotation ρi. Because a stable pair appears in at most one rotation (claim 4.3, part 3), this
means every rotation in Π is in this sequence.
(3) Assume for contradiction that ρj is a predecessor of ρi for i < j. We have two cases.
Suppose ρj is a type 1 predecessor of ρi. By definition, there exists a pair (m,w) such that ρj
moves m to w, and (m,w) appears in ρi. By 4.3, part 2, rotations always move women to men
which they rank higher than their current match, this means that in µj, w was matched below m
(i.e. m ≻w µj(w)). But (m,w) are matched in µi. Thus, we cannot have µi ≤ µj, a contradiction.
Now suppose ρj is a type 2 predecessor of ρi. By definition, there exist (m,w) such that ρj
moves w from below m to above m and ρi moves m from above w to below w. Thus, in µj, w is
matched below m, and in µi+1, m is matched below w. Now, µi+1 ≤ µj, so in µj, w is also matched
below m. But this means that µi+1 is not stable, a contradiction.
Note that part 3 above implies that G(Π) is an acyclic graph.
We’ll see next that only stable matchings arise in the way described by the previous claim.
In other words, the type 1 and type 2 predecessor relations are the only issues to applying any
sequence of rotations you would like.
Our strategy will be to show that every topological sort of G(Π) corresponds to a maximal
chain in L. We start with an arbitrary chain which corresponds to some topological sort, and the
apply a special type of “commutativity operation” in order to transform that initial topological
sort into the one we want (while preserving the property of corresponding to some maximal chain
along the way). The next claim is a technical lemma which provides the type of commutativity
operation needed. Another way to summarize this claim is that two adjacent rotations which are
not predecessors do not interfere with each other.
Claim 4.6. Suppose µ0 < µ1 < µ2, where each matching covers the previous
one. Let ρ0 and ρ1 be the corresponding rotations, i.e. µi+1 is the elimination
of ρi from µi for i = 0, 1. Assume that ρ0 is not a predecessor of ρ1 in G(Π).
Then ρ1 is also exposed in µ0. Moreover, if µ
′
1 is the elimination of ρ1 from µ0,
then ρ0 is exposed in µ
′
1, and µ2 is the elimination of ρ0 from µ
′
1.
µ1
µ2
µ0
µ′1
ρ1 ρ0
ρ1ρ0
Proof. Recall that every agent who does not appear in ρ0 receives the same match in µ0 and µ1.
First, we claim that no agent can appear in both rotations. Proof: If some man m appeared in
both rotation, then ρ0 moved m to some woman µ1(m), and then (µ1(m),m) must appear in ρ1.
If a woman w appears in both rotations, then the pair (w,µ1(w)) appears in ρ1, so ρ0 must move
µ1(w) to w. Because we’ve assumed that ρ0 is not a type 1 predecessor of ρ1, neither of the above
cases can occur.
Now, let w0 be a woman appearing in ρ1 and consider MPDA(Pw0(µ0)). We claim that this
produces a stable outcome and no woman receives more than one proposal from a man she prefers
to her match in µ0. Proof: Let ρ1 = [(w0,m0), (w1,m1), . . . , (wk−1,mk−1)]. In MPDA(Pw0(µ0)),
the free man is initially m0. Consider the proposals that mi makes after he is rejected by wi. Some
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of the women he proposes to may be at different matches in µ0 than in µ1 (specifically, those women
who were moved by ρ1). However, for all such women w who mi ranks above wi+1, w cannot be
matched below mi, or else ρ0 would be a type 2 predecessor of ρ1 by definition. Because none of
the agents in ρ2 appear in ρ1, wi+1 has the same match in µ0 as in µ1. Thus, all the women mi
proposes to before wi+1 will reject him, but wi+1 will accept him. Thus, by induction, the rejection
chain of MPDA(Pw0(µ0)) will be exactly the same as in MPDA(Pw0(µ1)). By claim 4.2, this
means ρ1 is exposed in µ0 and that and µ
′
1 =MPDA(Pw0(µ0)) is the elimination of ρ1 in µ0.
Finally, consider running MPDA(Pw′
0
(µ′1)) for some w
′
0 appearing in ρ0. Let ρ1 = [(w
′
0,m
′
0),
. . . , (w′k′−1,m
′
k′−1)], and again consider a free man m
′
i during this rejection chain. The only dif-
ference between µ′1 and µ0 is that the women who appear in ρ1 have received better partners.
However, wi+1 is still matched to µ0(wi+1), again because the agents in ρ0 and ρ1 are disjoint. The
women mi proposes to before wi+1 can only have higher matches than in µ0, so they will still reject
his proposals. But wi+1 will still accept. Thus, MPDA(Pw∗(µ
′
1)) will terminate with exactly ρ1
eliminated from µ′1, and no woman will recieve multiple proposals from a man she prefers to her
match in µ′1. So ρ1 was exposed in µ
′
1.
Finally, it’s clear from the definitions that the elimination of ρ0 from µ
′
1 is µ2 (the match of
every agent is uniquely determined as either the match from µ0 or the match which is uniquely
specified in ρ0 or ρ1).
Now we can prove that only maximal chains arise from topological sorts of G(Π). One short
way to summarize this proof is the following: we can transform any two topological sorts of G(Π)
between each other using only the “adjacent order swapping” operation given by the previous
lemma5. Thus, starting from a fixed topological sort of G(Π) (which corresponds to a maximal
chain by claim 4.5) we see than any other topological sort will also correspond to a maximal chain.
Claim 4.7. Consider any topological sort ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1 of G(Π), i.e. an ordering of each element
of Π such that whenever ρi is a predecessor of ρj, we have i < j. Then this sequence corresponds
to a maximal chain µ0, µ1, . . . , µk in the stable matching lattice L such that µ0 is the man-optimal
stable outcome, µi+1 is the elimination of ρi from µi, and µk is the woman-optimal outcome.
Proof. For this proof, say that a permutation ρ′0, . . . , ρ
′
k−1 of the set Π is valid if there exists
µ′0, µ
′
1, . . . , µ
′
k a maximal chain in L such that µi+1 is the elimination of ρi from µi for each i.
Fix any arbitrary maximal chain µ0 < µ1 < . . . < µk in L. By claim 4.5, there exists a
corresponding valid sequence ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1 of rotations which is a topological sort of G(Π). Now,
given any permutation of 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, say say i0, i1, . . . , ik−1, we’ll prove that ρi0 , ρi1 , . . . , ρik−1
is valid using induction on the number of inversions of the permutation (i.e. the number of pairs
j < k such that ij > ik). If there are no inversions, then ij = j for each j and we are done.
Now, suppose I = i0, i1, . . . , ik−1 has at least one inversion and let ij, ij+1 be any adjacent
inverted pair (if no adjacent inverted pairs exist, then no inverted pairs can exists). Consider the
ordering I ′ = i0, . . . , ij−1, ij+1, ij , ij+2, . . . , ik−1. There is exactly one fewer inverted pair in this
new ordering than in the original one, so by induction the ordering on rotations corresponding to
I ′ is valid. Say this ordering on rotations corresponds to a maximal chain containing the matchings
µa < µb < µc, where µb is the elimination of ρij+1 from µa and µc is the elimination of ρij from
µb. Because both ρ0, . . . , ρk−1 and ρi0 , . . . , ρik−1 are topological sorts of G(Π), ρij and ρij+1 cannot
be in a predecessor relation. Thus, applying claim 4.6 to the covering relations µa < µb < µc, we
see that the original ordering ρi0 , ρi1 , . . . , ρik−1 is also valid (and only the matching µb is different
along the corresponding maximal chain).
5 One way to do this (different then outlined in our formal proof) is to label the first list of rotations with
0, 1, . . . , k − 1, then simply bubble sort the second list of rotations.
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Thus, every topological sort of G(Π) is valid by induction.
Finally, after one more simple definition, we arrive at our long sought after bijection.
Definition 4.8. A closed subset S of G(Π) is a collection of rotations such that, whenever ρ2 is
in S and ρ1 is a predecessor of ρ2, then ρ1 is in S.
Theorem 4.9. There is a bijection between the collection of closed subsets of G(Π) and the stable
matching lattice L.
This bijection is given as follows: for a closed subset S of Π, let ρ0, . . . , ρi be a topological sort
of S in G(Π). Let µ0 be the man-optimal stable outcome, and let µj+1 be the elimination of ρj from
µj for each j = 0, . . . , i. Then the matching corresponding to S is given by µi+1.
Furthermore, let µ1 and µ2 be stable matchings corresponding to S1 and S2 respectively. Then
µ2 woman-dominates µ1 (i.e. µ2 ≥ µ1) if and only if S2 ⊇ S1.
Proof. First, we show that this correspondence is surjective. Given a matching µ, consider a
maximal chain µ0 < µ1 < . . . < µk containing it, say µ = µi. By claim 4.5, there exists a
corresponding sequence of rotations ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1. Consider the set S = {ρj}j<i. For each
ρj ∈ S and ρ
′ a predecessor of ρ, ρ′ must also be in S because ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1 is a topological sort.
So S is closed in G(Π). Furthermore, µ = µi is exactly given by the successive elimination of the
rotations ρ0, . . . , ρi−1, starting from µ0. So S corresponds to µ.
Next, we show the correspondence is injective. Let S1, S2 be distinct closed subsets of G(Π),
let matching µ1, µ2 correspond to S1, S2, and without loss of generality take ρ ∈ S1 \ S2. Because
ρ has been eliminated in µ1 but not in µ2, any woman w appearing in ρ must prefer their match
in µ1 to their match in µ2. Thus, µ1 and µ2 cannot be the same matching.
Finally, let µ1, µ2 ∈ L correspond to S1, S2 ⊆ G(Π). We have µ1 ≤ µ2 if and only if each woman
w does at least as well in µ2 as in µ1. For a fixed woman w, this occurs if and only if every rotation
involving w which appears in S1 also appears in S2. This is equivalent to the condition that every
rotation which appears in S1 also appearing in S2, i.e. S1 ⊆ S2.
Remark: Because the bijection above respects ordering (i.e. µ2 ≥ µ1 if and only if S2 ⊇ S1),
the bijection above is actually a lattice isomorphism. So joins and meets in L correspond to joins
and meets in the lattice of close subsets of the graph G(Π), which is given by set union and set
intersection, respectively.
5 Efficiently Finding Rotations
5.1 A simple example
We start with an example of how to use the facts proven above. Let men and women’s preference
list be as illustrated in the right column of Figure 2. The borders in the table highlight the
preferences which cause the different rotations to form, and the boldfaced entries correspond to a
type 2 predecessor relationship.
For the sake of illustration, let us denote a stable matching µ as (µ(m1)µ(m2)...µ(mn)) (e.g.
(123456) means every mi is matched to wi). It is easy to see that µ0 = (123456) is the man-optimal
stable matching in this example.
16
w1 w2
m1
m2 ρ1
w1 w3
w4
w5
w6
m2
m3
m4
m5
m2
m6
ρ2
ρ3
w2 w4 w5
w3
m1 m4
m5m3
m1
ρ2
ρ1 ρ2
ρ3
Type 1 Type 2
m1 w1 w2 w4
m2 w2 w1 w3 w6
m3 w3 w4
m4 w4 w5
m5 w5 w3
m6 w6 w1
w1 m6 m2 m1
w2 m1 m2
w3 m5 m2 m3
w4 m3 m1 m4
w5 m4 m5
w6 m2 m6
(123456)
(213456) (124536)
(214536)
(264531)
Figure 2: A sample instance with rotation poset and stable matching lattice.
Now, imagine runningMPDA(Pw1(µ0)) (where woman 1 truncate her list just above m1). The
rejection chain is (w1,m1, w2,m2, w1), and each woman recieves at most one proposals from a man
she prefers to her match in µ0, so by claim 4.2 we’ve discovered the rotation ρ1 = [(w1,m1), (w2,m2)].
Next we run MPDA(Pw2(µ1)). The rejection chain is (w2,m1, w4,m4, w5,m5, w3,m3, w4,m1).
As man m1 failed to find a new partner, we know that the result cannot be stable (and indeed by
claim 3.5,m1 is the best stable partner of w2). However, we still “learned something” along the way:
w4 accepted a proposal from both m1 and m3, and the rejection chain included her twice. If we had
started the rejection chain from w4, we could have actually gotten MPDA(Pw4(µ1)) = (214536),
a new stable matching which differs from µ1 by the rotation ρ2 = [(w4,m4), (w5,m5), (w3,m3)].
Thus, we can note this rotation ρ2 and also the fact that w2 has reached her best stable partner.
Because of the pair (m2, w1), we know ρ1 is a type 1 predecessor of ρ3. Indeed, ρ1 must be
eliminated before ρ3, because w1 must be paired to m2 before ρ3 could possible happen
6.
Finally, the rejection chain ofMPDA(Pw1(µ2)) is simply (w1,m2, w6,m6, w1). This corresponds
to the last rotation ρ3 = [(w1,m2), (w6,m6)]. Because of the pair (m2, w3), we know ρ2 is a
type 2 predecessor of ρ3. Why does this mean that ρ2 must be eliminated before ρ3? Consider
trying to eliminate ρ3 before ρ2, for example, by running MPDA(Pw1(µ1)). The rejection chain is
(w1,m2, w3,m3, w4,m4, w5,m5, w3,m2, w6,m6, w1), and w3 got two proposals and accepted them
both. The rejection chain between those two proposals corresponds to ρ2. Thus, trying to eliminate
ρ3 triggered the elimination of ρ2, even though none of the agents in ρ3 appear in ρ2.
6 For an example of what would happen if you try to eliminate a type 1 predecessor before its successor, see
figure 1.
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5.2 Algorithm description
Given what we know, the high-level interpretation of algorithm 2 is fairly intuitive. The algorithm
starts from the man-optimal stable outcome µ0. Along the way, it maintains a matching µ˜, which is
always stable, and initially set to µ0. From that point on, our goal is to make the smallest possible
changes upward in the lattice L, i.e. to make it so that each new value of µ˜ covers the old value.
The algorithm works by picking any woman wˆ, and simulating the proposals and rejections made
in MPDA(Pwˆ(µ˜)) by having wˆ “divorce” her husband and continuing to run deferred acceptance.
By claim 3.6, we get a new matching which covers µ˜ (i.e. we find a rotation) if and only if no
woman receives multiple proposals from a man she prefers to her match in µ˜. We cannot efficiently
guarantee that this will hold for the wˆ that we pick. However, we can get around this issue by
using the following trick: when a woman considers a new proposal, she decides whether to accept
as if she were still matched to her partner in µ˜, even if she has already accepted a proposal that
puts her above that man7. Then, whenever a woman w∗ receives a second proposal from a man
she prefers to her match in µ˜, we pause for a minute. We consider stable matching corresponding
to the execution of MPDA between these two proposals which w∗ receives. This corresponds to
runningMPDA(Pw∗(µ˜)) and getting a matching µ
′ which covers µ˜. So we reset µ˜ to the equivalent
of µ′ and record the corresponding rotation in the graph G.
To prevent the algorithm from doing unnecessary repeated work, and to efficiently keep track
of when we reach the woman-optimal outcome, we maintain a set S. Whenever a rejection chain
starting with wˆ ends in an unmatched woman or unmatched man, we know by claim 3.5 that wˆ
cannot receive a better stable match. Because we eliminate all cycles along the way, every woman
after wˆ on the rejection chain would also trigger this same event. Thus, each woman on the current
rejection chain has reached their optimal match, and can be added to S. The algorithm runs until
S is all of W.
Along the way, we keep track of type 1 and type 2 predecessor using a straightforward application
of their definition. For the type 1 predecessors, it suffices to look at which rotations move the men,
and create predecessor relations between each successive rotations moving the same man. For the
type 2 predecessors, intuitively we detect under which conditions eliminating ρ2 would force the
elimination of ρ1, because some woman who appears in ρ1 would have accepted a proposal that
a man m makes as he moves through ρ2. To implement this, we label the men on each woman’s
preference list, putting a label ρ for each woman w in ρ and each man m such that ρ moves w from
below m to above m. Then, we accumulate the corresponding rotations as the men make proposals
(i.e. as a man m gets rejected by some woman w, we label m with any rotation that moved w from
below to above m).
5.3 Proof of correctness
Our main procedure is given in full detail as algorithm 2. An execution sequence of algorithm 2 is
defined by the choice of rejections that the algorithm triggers, more specifically, by each choices of
the woman wˆ every time we reach line 7. As in the case of MPDA, we will see that the final result
is independent of these choices and that the total amount of work done is O(n2).
7 Again, figure 1 provides an example of why this is necessary. There, if w2 compared m3 against her match in µ
(namely m1) instead of in µ˜ (namely m2) then we would not find two distinct rotations ρ1 and ρ2. Instead, we would
find the list [(w1,m1), (w2,m2), (w3,m3)], which is not a rotation because eliminating it from µ0 does not result in a
matching which covers µ0, i.e. we would miss some stable matchings in between µ0 and the next matching found in
µ˜.
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Algorithm 2 Finding the Rotations and Predecessor Graph
Input A stable matching instance with men M and women W
Output A direct graph G on the rotations of the instance
1: Let µ˜ be the man-optimal stable matching from MPDA; Let µ be a copy of µ˜
2: For each man m, let R(m) be the set of women who rejected m during the run of MPDA.
3: Let S be the set of unmatched women in µ
4: Set pred1m = ∅ for each man m ⊲ Store the most recent rotation moving m
5: For each woman w and each man m on w’s list, label m in the list with ∅
⊲ Store rotations moving w from below to above men
6: while S 6=W do
7: Pick any wˆ ∈ W \ S ⊲ These selections define an execution sequence
8: Let m = µ(wˆ); let V = [(wˆ,m)]
9: Set µ(wˆ) = ∅ and add wˆ to R(m) ⊲ wˆ rejects m
10: Let pred2m = ∅ ⊲ Keep track of predecessor rotations
11: while V 6= [ ] do
12: Let w ← NextAcceptingWoman(m)
13: if w = ∅ or w ∈ S then ⊲ No stable matching exists rotating partners in V
14: Restore µ← µ˜
15: Add all women in V to S; Set V = [ ]
16: else if w appears in V then ⊲ New rotation found
17: if w 6= wˆ then
18: Swap µ(w)↔ m ⊲ w does not reject m yet (see Claim 5.2, item 2))
19: BuildNewRotation(w)
20: else ⊲ Continue building rejection chain V
21: Append (w,µ(w)) to the end of V
22: Swap µ(w)↔ m; Add w to R(m) ⊲ w rejects µ(w)
23: Let pred2m = ∅ ⊲ Keep track of predecessor rotations
24: function NextAcceptingWoman(m)
25: Let w be m’s most preferred woman not in R(m) (or ∅)
26: while w 6= ∅ and µ˜(w) >w m do ⊲ while w has received a better stable match
27: Add w to R(m) ⊲ w rejects m
28: If w labeled m with ρ, add ρ to pred2m
⊲ If rotation ρ moved w above m, then ρ must precede the current rotation
29: Update w to m’s top woman not in R(m) (or set w to ∅)
30: Return w
31: function BuildNewRotation(w)
32: Suppose V = [(w1,m1), (w2,m2), . . . , (wk,mk)] with w = wℓ for some ℓ ≤ k
33: Update µ˜(wi) = µ(wi) for each i = ℓ, ℓ+ 1, . . . , J ⊲ Eliminate new rotation ρ
∗
34: Remove ρ∗ = [(wℓ,mℓ), . . . , (wk,mk)] from V
35: Add rotation ρ∗ with type 1 predecessors
⋃k
i=ℓ pred
1
mi
36: and type 2 predecessors
⋃k
i=ℓ pred
2
mi
to G
37: for each i = ℓ, . . . , k do Set pred1mi = ρ
∗
38: for each i = ℓ, . . . , k, and for each man
39: m between mi and mi−1 (or mℓ and mk if i = ℓ) on wi’s list do:
40: wi labels m with ρ
∗
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Claim 5.1. At any step of algorithm 2, every woman in the set S has reached her optimal stable
match.
Proof. We prove this claim by induction on the number of iterations (of the outer loop in Algo-
rithm 2 from line 7 to line 26) the algorithm has run. Let Vi, µ˜i, Si denote the value of V, µ˜, S at
the end of iteration i respectively.
Firstly, S0 is the set of all unmatched women in MOSM. All women in S0 has already reached
their optimal match by the rural hospital theorem 2.4.
Next, assume for k ≤ i, every woman in Sk has reached her optimal stable match at the end
of iteration k. If Si+1 = Si, then the same must hold for Si+1. If Si+1 6= Si, then at the end of
iteration i+ 1 the algorithm must have entered the if branch on line 13, which adds all women in
V to S in line 15. Let w(Vi) be the set of all woman in Vi. Then Si+1 = Si ∪ w(Vi+1). We claim
that every woman in w(Vi+1) must have reached their optimal stable matching in µ˜i+1.
Observe that at any point where a woman w receives two proposals from men she prefers to her
match in µ˜, the algorithm enters the if branch on line 20, where subroutine BuildNewRotation
updates µ˜. After the update, all women in V have received at most one proposal from men she
prefers to her match in µ˜. Thus only the last woman in the rejection chain could have received
more than one proposal from men she prefers to her in µ˜i+1. However, the last woman is either
∅ or in Si, and is never added to Vi+1. Therefore every woman in w(Vi+1) has only received one
proposal from men she prefers to her match in µ˜i+1.
Let Vi+1 = [(w1,m1), (w2,m2)...(wt,mt)]. Since V represent the rejection chain inMPDA(Pw1(µ˜i+1)),
we know that MPDA(Pw1(µ˜i+1)) results in an unstable matching. Moreover, since all woman
wj ∈ w(Vi+1) only receives one proposal (from men mj−1) that she prefers to her match in µ˜i+1,
MPDA(Pwj (µ˜i+1)) must have the rejection chain [(wj ,mj), ...(wt,mt)], and also result in an un-
stable matching. By Claim 3.5, wj is pair with her optimal stable partner in µ˜i+1 already.
Claim 5.2. Algorithm 2 terminates and runs in O(n2) time.
Proof. Thoughout the algorithm, at each time step, one of the following events happen: (1) a
woman rejects a man m, (2) a man propose to a woman w, either after being rejected or the man
repropose after a rotation has been built, (3) A new rotation ρ is extracted, (4) an earlier rotation
is added as type 1 or type 2 predecessor of new rotation ρ and (5) women are added to S. Each
event above takes constant time. We show below that the total number of above events is O(n2).
1) Woman w can only reject man m once. Thus in total event (1) happen O(n2) times.
2) We’d like to say that (as in the case of deferred acceptance) every man proposes to every
woman at most once. However, there is an important exception to this: when a man m is
tentatively matched to a woman in µ (i.e. m is in V ), but the woman receives a new proposal
which she accepts, then the man must propose to the woman again after the corresponding
rotation has been created. However, this can happen at most once for every rotation, and by
claim 4.3, there are O(n2) rotations. So the total number of proposals made is still O(n2).
3) There are O(n2) rotations, and each rotation is found at most once.
4) Throughout the algorithm, a rotation ρ is added to pred1m only when ρ changes m’s stable
partner to some woman w. m can only have O(n) different stable partners, and there are
only O(n) men. Thus a rotation can only be added as a type 1 predecessor O(n2) times.
Similarly, we can count the number of type 2 edges. A rotation ρ is added to pred2m only
when w labeled m with ρ, and w rejects m. Moreover, each man on w’s list receives at most
one label. So a rotation is added as a type 2 predecessor O(n2) times.
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5) A fixed woman m can only be added to S once. Thus event (5) occur O(n) times.
As we do a constant amount of work for all these events, we conclude that the execution time
is O(n2).
We now prove that algorithm 2 traverses a maximal chain from the man-optimal to the woman-
optimal stable outcome. Using the theory built up in section 4, this will allow us to fairly easily
prove that algorithm 2 correctly outputs all rotations Π and the predecessor digraph G(Π).
Claim 5.3. During the execution of algorithm 2, let the MPDA(P ) = µ0, µ1, . . . , µk denote the
values µ˜ in order, and let ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1 denote the values of ρ
∗ inserted into G in order. Then
each µi is a stable matching, µk is the woman-optimal stable match, and µi+1 is the elimination
of ρi from µi for each i. In other words, µ0, µ1, . . . , µn is a maximal chain in the stable matching
lattice L, with corresponding rotation sequence ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk−1.
Proof. First, we show by induction that each µi is stable. Assume that µ˜ is stable and the Build-
NewRotation function is called on line 19. Let w∗ denote the current value of w at that line (so
w∗ is the woman in V who just accepted a proposal from a man she prefers to her match in µ˜),
and let ρ∗ be as on line 34. Consider the sequence of rejections made after the last time µ˜ was
changed. No woman in ρ∗ other than (possibly) w∗ has received multiple proposals from a man she
preferred to her match in µ˜. Furthermore, the sequence of rejections and proposals made between
the first occurrence of w∗ in V is exactly those made in MPDA(Pw∗(µ˜)), i.e. the rejection chain
of w∗ starting from µ˜ corresponds exactly to ρ∗. By 3.6, µ′ = MPDA(Pw∗(µ˜)) covers µ˜. But the
new value of µ˜, set on line 33, is exactly µ′ (which is exactly the elimination of rotation ρ∗ from
µ˜). Thus, µi+1 covers µi for each i, and µi+1 is the elimination of ρi from µi.
Algorithm 2 terminates only when S is all of W. But by claim 5.1, S consist only of women
who have reached their optimal stable match in µ˜. Thus, when the algorithm terminates, µ˜ is the
woman-optimal stable match.
Claim 5.4. Every rotation of Π is found and put into G over the course of algorithm 2. Further-
more, if ρ1 is a predecessor of ρ2 (type 1 or type 2) then ρ1 will be found before ρ2. Moreover, the
set of predecessors in G of every rotation ρ are exactly the type 1 and type 2 predecessors defined
above, i.e. G = G(Π).
Proof. The first two statements now readily follow from the previous claim and claim 4.5 (parts 2
and 3 respectively).
We know that for each rotation ρ∗, each predecessor of ρ∗ has certainly been found by the time
we construct ρ∗. We now show that the predecessors of ρ∗ are appropriately marked. The type 1
predecessors are added on line 35, and they are exactly the most recently found rotations moving
man m (as consistently updated on line 37). But the most recent rotation moving m must be the
unique rotation which moved m to his current match w, where (w,m) appears in ρ∗. So the type
1 predecessors of ρ∗ are accurately marked.
For the type 2 predecessors, consider a man m who appears in ρ∗ and moves from w to w′.
From the time m entered V (in line 10 or 23), we added to pred2m (on line 28) each rotation ρ such
that m was rejected by a woman w and ρ moved w from below m to above m (all such rotations
are predecessors of ρ∗, and thus have already been found and appropriately marked on lines 39
to 40). As m is rejected by each woman between w and w′ on his list, this covers all possible type
2 predecessors of ρ∗, so the type 2 predecessors are accurately marked on line 36.
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We can now immediately conclude from claims 5.2 and 5.4 that the rotation predecessor graph
G(Π) can be correctly and efficiently computed.
Theorem 5.5. Algorithm 2 computes G(Π) in O(n2) time.
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A Contrasting Our Proofs With Those of [GI89]
The primary difference between our approach and the original is that [GI89] starts by defining a
partial order on the set of rotations Π, then constructs a directed acyclic graph G and proves that
the transitive closure of G gives the correct order on Π. In contrast, we start with G = G(Π) and
are able to prove directly that G(Π) represents the set of all stable matchings.
Our definition of rotations is similar to that of [GI89]. The only difference is that we define rota-
tions to be the difference between two stable matchings where one covers the other, whereas [GI89]
essentially defines rotations as rejection chains of MPDA (where no woman receives multiple pro-
posals from a better man than her old match) without explicitly mentioning MPDA (GI89 must
prove that rotations give covering relations in their lemma 2.5.5, although they do not explicitly
use the term “covering”).
[GI89] defines a partial order relation on Π via the partial order relation on their “minimal
difference on a ring of sets”. In turn, the ordering on the minimal differences is defined via the
lattice ordering, restricted to the “irreducible elements (other than the man-optimal)”. Building
the theory of these partial orders occupies [GI89] for the entirety of their Chapter 2 (pages 67 to
102). We believe that intuition is lost through these layers of definition.
There are two steps to proving that the transitive closure of G is exactly the partial order on
Π. First, every edge in G should be related in Π. We find that the essence of the proof in [GI89]
(lemma 3.2.3) goes through without referencing a partial order on Π at all. We capture this with
our claim 4.5, which shows that any valid sequence of rotations respects G.
The second step is to show that every relation in Π is in the transitive closure of G. [GI89]
heavily relies on the existing partial order on Π for this step of their proof (lemma 3.2.4) because
they prove that any immediate predecessor (i.e. a covering relation) in Π must be related in G.
We are able to skip this crucial reliance on an order on Π via our claim 4.7, which proves that
every ordering of rotations which respects G corresponds to a maximal chain in the stable matching
lattice. The key lemma we use is claim 4.6, which shows that if two rotations are adjacent in some
topological sort and do not have an edge between them, then that pair of rotations can be swapped
(while maintaining the property that the topological sort corresponds to a maximal chain).
In the end, our method amounts to showing that the collection of topological sorts of G is in
a bijection with the linear extensions of Π, and using a “swapping” lemma like claim 4.6 to prove
the correspondence in one direction. The linear extensions of Π are particularly natural objects
in our case (as they correspond to maximal chains in the stable matching lattice). To the best
of our knowledge, this strategy for proving that a graph gives a certain transitive closure has not
been used before. It may be useful in other situations involving distributive lattices where maximal
chains in the lattice are easy to reason about.
As in [GI89], we deliberately avoid mentioning Birkhoff’s representation theorem. While this
classical theorem immediately shows the existence of some partial order which represents any
distributive lattice, it does not show how to find this representation or give any structure regarding
what the elements of the partial order are. Indeed, Birkhoff’s theorem by itself could not even show
that the partial order Π is polynomial-size.
B A Minor Error in [GI89]
The minimal-differences algorithm of [GI89] (more precisely, figure 3.2 on page 110) correctly
identifies all of the rotations in a stable matching instance. However, there is a slight error in
the construction of the order relations for the rotation poset. In particular, once the rotations are
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found (via an algorithm essentially equivalent to our algorithm 2, but without keeping track of
predecessor relations), they propose Algorithm 3 as shown below.
Algorithm 3 Construct predecessor relations
1: for Each rotation ρ and pair (mi, wi) ∈ ρ do
2: Label wi in mi’s preference list with a type 1 ρ label
3: for Each m strictly between mi and mi−1 on wi’s list do
4: Label wi in m’s preference list with a type 2 ρ label
5: for Each man m do
6: Set ρ∗ = ∅
7: for Each woman w on m’s preference list, in order do
8: if w has a type 1 label of ρ then
9: if ρ∗ 6= ∅ then Add ρ∗ as a predecessor of ρ
10: Set ρ∗ = ρ
11: if w has a type 2 label of ρ then
12: if ρ∗ 6= ∅ then Add ρ as a predecessor of ρ∗
The idea behind this algorithm is reasonable: certainly the type 1 labels in any man’s chain
should be related in the poset (as the man needs to reach a certain partner before the next rotation
can be found). Furthermore, suppose a type 2 label ρ2 is between two type 1 labels, ρ1 and ρ3.
We know that ρ1 moved m from his partner in ρ1 to his partner is ρ3, as men propose in their
preference order at most once to each woman. Along the rejection chain from his partner in ρ1 to
his partner in ρ3, m would propose to some woman w in ρ2, and w likes m better than her match
in ρ2. Thus, the rejection chain of ρ1 will certainly trigger ρ2, and ρ1 must be a predecessor of ρ2.
However, the above reasoning fails in certain cases. Namely, in the case where there is a type
1 label ρ∗ followed by a type 2 label ρ on woman w, but in ρ∗ man m does not move from above
w to below w. In this case, the rejection sequence ρ∗ does not actually trigger rotation ρ.
m1 1 2 3
m2 2 1 3
m3 3 5 1
m4 4 3 5
m5 5 4
w1 3 2 1
w2 1 2
w3 2 4 1 3
w4 5 4
w5 4 3 5
(12345)
(21345) (12534)
(21534)
(23154)
m1 1 2 3
T1ρ1 T2ρ2
m2 2 1 3
T1ρ1 T1ρ3
m3 3 5 1
T1ρ2 T1ρ3
m4 4 3 5
T1ρ2 T1ρ3
m5 5 4
T1ρ2
Figure 3: A tricky case for algorithm 3, including the labeled preference lists.
For a concrete counterexample, consider the stable matching instance in figure 3, drawn along-
side its lattice L (with matchings written as the by writing the partner of w1, w2, . . . , w5 in
order). The rotations of this instance are ρ1 = [(1, 2), (2, 1)], ρ2 = [(3, 3), (4, 4), (5, 5)], and
ρ3 = [(2, 1), (4, 3), (3, 5)], and ρ1 and ρ2 are both type 1 predecessors of ρ3. The labeled pref-
erence list of the men, given by applying algorithm 3, is also drawn in figure 3.
The above algorithm causes ρ1 to be marked as a predecessor of ρ2, even though they are
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independent and both exposed in the man-optimal stable matching. Our algorithm 2 circumvents
this problem by storing the type 1 and type 2 labels in different places, and detecting the required
orderings on the rotations more directly.
Another way around this problem, which is more similar to [GI89]’s algorithm 3, would be to
write “type 1 end markers” for the final type 1 label in each man’s preference list (note that this
problem can only happen for type 2 labels after the final type 1 label, because if there is another
type 1 label after the type 2 label, the man must actually move below the woman w where the
type 2 label was marked). More specifically, for the last type 1 label on m’s list, say of a rotation
ρ, mark “type 1 end” on the woman w for which ρ moves m to w. Then, ignore any type 2 labels
after the “type 1 end” mark.
25
